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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for review of a decision of a panel of
the Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson (herein "Panel").
The Panel's decision affirmed dismissal of this action by the trial court. It was filed
June 7, 1990, and rehearing was denied August 6, 1990. The Supreme Court has
discretionary jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to §78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code and
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This petition presents the following questions:
1.

Whether this petition presents important questions of municipal law which

have not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
2.

Whether the Appeal Court Panel applied a standard of review in conflict

with standards adopted by the Supreme Court.
3.

Whether the Panel held as determinative statutes which have no

application to this action.
3.

Whether the Panel's decision was rendered without benefit of briefing and

argument so as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision to
correct resulting errors.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES. AND ORDINANCES
Determinative statutes include §§10-1-104(1), 10-1-104(11), 10-2-401, 10-2-418,
10-9-9, 10-9-15, and 17-27-16, and are set forth in Appendix "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was filed by Sandy City to challenge Salt Lake County's conditional
use approval of 4.18 acre commercial development in an unincorporated island within

Sandy's boundaries. State statutes restrict such projects adjacent to city boundaries
where development costs exceed $750,000. Motions for summary judgment were filed by
all parties in the district court. The City also moved to strike certain of defendant's
affidavits and documents and filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit in support of additional
discovery time. The City's motions were denied and summary judgment was entered for
defendants.
On June 7, 1990, a Panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment.1 The Panel based its decision on an issue which had not been previously
considered, briefed or argued. It erroneously found that the City had not properly
appealed a County rezoning of the property prior to the County's conditional use
approval. The Panel also applied standards of review which gave undue deference to
County discretion in determining its own jurisdictional limits. The City's Petition for
Rehearing was denied on August 6, 1990. The petition and the order of denial are
attached hereto as Appendix "C" and "D," respectively.
The following undisputed facts demonstrate that the City did properly object to
and appeal the County's rezoning:
1.

Prior to any rezoning decision, the County sent the City a copy of the

rezoning application and requested its recommendation. R15-17. The zoning application
omitted the estimate of project value required by the application form. But it did admit
that the rezoning would not comply with the County's current land use plan. R15. The
City augmented this admission by its own written objection stating that the plan also
violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and Crescent Community Citizen's Report. R17.

The Panel's opinion is is set forth in Appendix MB."

2

5, Document 9, p. 1114.

2.

A sketch of the project site was apparently available at the time of

rezoning. Envelope 6 #21. However, there was "not a specific use proposed for the
overall properties" at the time the application was made or when rezoning was
considered. R15; Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904. Value would not be determined
until a building permit was actually issued. R i l l ; Envelope 4, Document 6, p.13. It
would have been impossible for the City to have estimated the cost of development at
that time.2 Nevertheless, the scale was sufficient to cause the City to inform the County
that "[t]he developer should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." R17.
3.

There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing

and its representatives did not attend.3 Nevertheless, the County Commission was
briefed at the hearing on Sandy's objection to the rezoning. Envelope 5, document 6.
The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that there may be a problem with
the project meeting the urban development restrictions of section 10-2-418 U.C.A,
depending on how the development plans were eventually presented. He concluded that
"Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the time the plans were submitted.
Envelope 5, document 6, p. 906.
4.

Based on representations of the Deputy County Attorney and other staff

members, the County Commission approved the rezoning. Envelope 5, document 6, pp.
906-907. The ordinance was published on August 20, 1987. R19.
5-

Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a

The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask
for a different zone depending on the market." The zoning was thereupon approved by the County
Commission without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property.
3

Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2.

3

rehearing of its zoning decision. R25. That petition reiterated that "[development on
the property would constitute 'urban development' and that the property owners had not
attempted to annex the property to Sandy City as required by §10-2-418, U.C.A. 1953."
The petition also stated that n[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this
property contradicts the Little Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for
rural residential use on the property." R25.
6.

The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit

City representatives to speak.4 The Commission denied the City's request and directed
that if the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning
Commission through the conditional use process. Envelope 5, Documents 8 - 9 .
7.

The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its

protest to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and
master plan violations described above. R27-29. When that was unsuccessful, the City
filed a timely appeal to the County Commission as required by County ordinance.5
When its protests were rejected there, the City prompdy initiated this action in
conformance with the process defined by the County Attorney.6

4

T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p. 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had
"ample opportunity to present evidence." p. 13.
5

R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision).

"Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not t±|e half mile is applicable." Envelope
5, Document 9, p. 1114.

4

2.

A sketch of the project site was apparently available at the time of

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS PETITION PRESENTS IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
OF MUNICIPAL LAW WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN, BUT
SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THE SUPREME COURT
A
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S POLICY OF COMPETING WITH CITIES TO
DELIVER MUNICIPAL SERVICES CREATES SERIOUS GOVERNANCE
PROBLEMS
Serious problems impede the delivery of municipal services within Salt Lake
County. They arise from intergovernmental conflicts and result in the proliferation of
service districts and attendant taxation inequities. They are summarized as follows:
1.

Service Delivery Impediments. The state legislature recognizes that

delivery of urban services is critical to citizen safety and the economic welfare of our
state. Utah counties lack the powers necessary to deliver a full range of municipal
services.7 Therefore, the Legislature has directed that such services should be dehvered
through municipal annexation into areas of growth potential or undergoing development
impact.8
Despite its lack of municipal powers, Salt Lake County has elected to sponsor
large-scale unincorporated development -- often along and within city boundaries and
"islands." Because cities cannot annex so as to create more unincorporated islands,9
county-approved developments, which resist annexation, can restrict annexation along the
entire length of a city boundary.

7

U T A H C O D E ANN. 10-1-104(1).

8

U T A H C O D E ANN. 10-2-401.

9

U T A H C O D E ANN. 10-2-417(l)(d).

Conflicts over vital urban services should be resolved through interlocal
cooperation. Politics have not permitted that to be so. The Legislature has tried to
help by adopting laws to promote urban planning. However, most of these statutes
address governmental entities separately within their own classification and miss the
critical intergovernmental focus. The result has been a hodgepodge of jurisdictions and
service delivery responsibilities.
The impact of local competition for territorial control of development is probably
best illustrated in Sandy City's own erratic boundaries and in the numerous
unincorporated islands within that City:

J-215

SANDY CITY BOUNDARY MAP
iiijlSLANDS TO BE ANNEXED
^

IF PETITIONED

AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED IF PETITIONED

H IN DISPUTE

R25

6

The urban development which is subject to this action was approved by the
County within one of these unincorporated islands and is marked in red above. There is
an obvious inefficiency of servicing central Sandy locations from remote County
facilities. This practice also encourages developers to shop within such islands for the
most attractive zoning and development standards - annexing where city standards are
favorable and "going unincorporated" where, as in most cases, County standards are
lower. As this process occurs, power over local planning subtly shifts into private hands
where interests are largely site-specific. The long term effect is planning ad hocery and
frustration of the objectives of local communities as they try to plan for its growth and
efficiently deliver services to their citizens.
2.

Service District Proliferation. Additional problems result from County

development policies. The county lacks the constitutional and statutory authority of a
city and can't meet the full service demands of unincorporated areas. So it has
encouraged the creation of special purpose districts to help compete with cities for
development.
The proliferation of special districts defeats representative government. Districts
exercise limited functions and operate apart from general units of government. The
territorial jurisdiction of districts often overlap, creating difficult problems particularly in
metropolitan areas.10 For these reasons, special district governance has been aptly
termed the "new dark continent of American politics."11

10

Robert W. Swensen, "A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II," 1985 Utah Law Review 1, 48.

11

See discussion in Benson, "Special Districts and Deficient Local Government in the Salt Lake Metropolitan
Area," 7 Utah Law Review 209, 212-216 (1960).

7

The Salt Lake valley poses the most serious problem in Utah. At least twelve
full-function cities and towns exist in the valley. Salt Lake Couny also engages in the
delivery of municipal services. Nevertheless, at least nineteen special purpose districts
have been organized to duplicate municipal functions and complicate the local
government puzzle:
The anomalous result is the existence of thirty-one units of local
government attempting to meet the needs of an area whose topography is
uniform and whose population is constantly becoming more evenly
distributed as suburbanization makes its rapid advance.12
3.

Taxation Excesses and Inequities. Taxation excesses are of paramount

public concern. The roots of local taxation problems lie within this maze of
governments and service delivery roles:
Are there any logical bases for dividing into special districts
governmental functions and responsibilities in a relatively compact area
such as the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, where nearly half of Utah's
population is concentrated? A few examples from the report of the Local
Government Survey Commission, which recently completed a factual study
of local government structure in Utah, provide the obvious answer.
Unnecessary expenses are incurred because special districts employ their
own legal counsel, thereby duplicating functions of the city or county
attorney's office. Expenses are further increased because there is no
central purchasing authority, and, consequently, none of the economies of
large-scale purchasing are realized. Duplicate purchases of equipment and
the necessary maintenance facilities as well as duplication of personnel
also increase costs. Taxpayers in some instances are subject simultaneously
to as many as five local government authorities. In such confusion
taxpayers sometimes do not even receive the specific service the district is
supposed to provide. For example, in the suburban area southeast of Salt
Lake City, taxpayers have to purchase water from ten private water
companies, as well as from Salt Lake City, and at the same time are taxed
by the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, from which they
receive no water. The compilers of the report felt that the latter situation
was "close to double taxation," and the inequality of the situation does

2

Benson, supra.

8

seem obvious."13
B.
THE LEGISLATURE ADOPTED THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
STATUTE TO ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS
In 1979, the Utah Legislature declared its intention to eliminate these
governmental disorders in the following statement of policy.
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that:
(1)
Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic
development of this state;
(2)
Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services
essential pr sound urban development and pr the protection of public health,
safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial areas, and in
areas undergoing development;
(3)
Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with specific
standards, to include areas where a higi quality of urban governmental
services is needed and can be provided pr the protection of public health,
safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation and the
proliferation of special service districts;
(4)
Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing
municipality, subject to Section 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the
annexation;
(5)
Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government;
(6)
Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban
development need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of
the proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other
governmental entities, on the need for and cost of local government
services and the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions,
and on factors related to population growth and density and the geography
of the area; and
(7)
Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state
responsibility.

13

Id., p. 212.

This important policy finally addressed the problem of competition by counties
for new development. It emphasized that urban development is the responsibility of
municipalities, which have the statutory authority to provide a full range of urban
services. Municipal annexation is defined as the means to promote such policy and
eliminate the evils of service district proliferation and double taxation.
This policy was accompanied by the introduction to a comprehensive planning
law. This new law was unlike prior planning statutes in that it finally addressed the
problem of competition between cities and counties for urban development.

Central to

that new law is §10-2-418, which states that "[u]rban development shall not be approved
or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area which the
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."14
The effect of this statute is to restrict counties from expanding their tax base
adjacent to cities and in unincorporated islands and thus reopen such territories to
annexation. Although this policy does not implement all aspects of legislative policy in a
single stroke, it at least limits growth of the problem and begins a critical evolution away
from self-destructive intergovernmental competition.
Revenue-conscious counties can't be expected to enforce the urban development
statute on their own. To be effective, this restriction must be judicially honored.
Without such aid from the courts, legislative intentions will be vitiated while service
delivery is retarded, urban planning is frustrated, service districts proliferate, and
taxation inequities continue unabated.

"Urban development" is defined to include Ma commercial or industrial development for which cost
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases." UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11).

10

C.
THE PANEL'S DECISION ROBS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
STATUTE OF ITS EFFECT BY CREATING IMPOSSIBLE BARRIERS TO
ITS ENFORCEMENT. THE EFFECT IS TO UNDO STATE LEGISLATION
AND DO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT.
The Appeal Court Panel ruled that cities cannot object to county approval of
urban development adjacent to their boundaries unless they have previously exhausted
an attack on the underlying zoning. The Panel stated:
Even though Sandy City, in its master policy declaration, had
indicated its interest in annexing the property should the property owners
so petition, the property owners never petitioned, nor did Sandy City
attempt to annex the property on its own. Further, it did not appeal the
county's initial zoning decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-9-9
(1986), and raise this issue at that time. Instead, it waited to raise the
issue on the subsequent grant of the conditional use permit, where the
relevant issues do not include the proposed use of the land or any
annexation issue, but only whether the proposed use comports with the
previously enacted zoning regulations and county master plan. Because
Sandy City could and should have raised this issue earlier, we find that it is
precluded from raising it now.15
The Panel misconstrued the record in concluding that the City did not timely
appeal the rezoning decision.16

The Panel's conclusion also contains a legal error. It

implies that if the underlying zoning of an area has not been appealed, that subsequent
county approvals cannot be challenged.
This legal conclusion relies on §10-9-9 of the Utah Municipal Code. That section
specifies an appeal procedure to city boards of adjustment from enforcement decisions17
by city officials. The Municipal Code has no application whatsoever to counties.18

15

Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
See discussion under Point IV.

17

UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-12(1).

18

UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1).

11

The effect is to redefine the urban development statute to permit any
unincorporated development on previously zoned land regardless of its cost or scale.
Cities presented with this new requirement will be powerless to comply, since
most county lands are already zoned. Even with new zoning proposals, the development
is often not defined so as to give cities a factual basis upon which to conclude that costs
will exceed the $750,000 jurisdictional limit.
The result is that the Panel's decision creates impossible barriers to enforcement
of the urban development statute in a manner which robs it of its intended meaning.
The effect of the decision is to undo the express language of a statute of critical
importance to the welfare of our state.
POINT II
THE APPEAL COURT PANEL AVOIDED CRITICAL ISSUES
BY APPLYING A STANDARD OF REVIEW IN CONFLICT
WITH STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT
A.

THE PANEL FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be

approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."
"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."19
The central issue in this action has been whether respondents' development
exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the County of approval authority. The

UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986).

12

County Director of Development Services, testifying before the Planning Commission,
confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will exceed the $750,000 figure."20
Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that their costs for just the first two
pads was $760,000.21 A later MAI appraisal showed that the costs of the entire
development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development restriction.22
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. Despite the testimony of
the developers and its own staff, it found that development costs were less than
$750,000.
On appeal, the Panel acknowledged that it could consider whether the County
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.23 It
cited Nayior v. Salt Lake City Corporation24 for the proposition that the Panel should not
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue.
The Nayior case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of
the City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he
statutory authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and
amending the same is not questioned" in that case.25 Thus the Nayior court merely

20

Rill.

21

R108.

22

R133-135.
Opinion, p. 11.

24

16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965).

25

/d., at p. 28.

13

confirmed that courts should not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative
discretion.
B.
THE COURT APPLIED A STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE
TO DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND NOT
TO QUESTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT JURISDICTION.
Statutory authority is the central issue in this appeal. Jurisdictional issues are not
discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized
only where counties act within their authority:
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of
the applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or
deny conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within
the boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority
is afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a
strong presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made,
courts will not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary,
unreasonable or an abuse of discretion."26
The review standard applied by the Panel reverses the proper role of the courts.
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, they becomes the validators of
the same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of
evidence which consistently denies them such powers. The Panel could not have
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests
that this Court consider the review standard the Panel so broadly applied in this appeal.

26

Thurston v. Cache Cty, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v.
Board of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will
be granted under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the
scope of its authority."
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POINT III
THE PANEL ALSO AVOIDED THE ISSUES BY
HOLDING AS DETERMINATIVE, STATUTES WHICH
HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THIS ACTION
A
THE MUNICIPAL CODE HAS NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER
TO COUNTY REZONINGS.
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code as a basis
for its refusal to review the merits of this appeal.27 These statutes have no application
to this appeal for the following reasons:
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a basis for its
conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.28 This
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to
city board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials. This section has
nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be
applied to this case.29
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here.
It addresses only to appeals from enprcement decisions and does not authorize the
board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones themselves. Further, this section does
not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals. Section 10-9-9 is facially
inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the basis to avoid consideration of

Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix MA.H
Opinion, p. 43. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A."
29

See Davis County v. Qearfeld City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where the Court of
Appeals rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to
municipal planning matters.
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the merits of this appeal.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also apparently used to establish
that the City had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's
rezoning.30 This section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing
decisions by city boards of adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part
of the Utah Municipal Code and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities
for the purposes of that code and this section has nothing to do with County zoning
decisions whatsoever.31 Even if it did apply to counties, it does not purport to establish
a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning decisions.
B.
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES RELIED ON BY THE
COURT HAVE DO NOT GOVERN REZONING DECISIONS BY ELECTED
COUNTY OFFICIALS.
Section 17-27-16 of the enabling act for counties was also cited by the Panel to
establish that "an appeal from a zoning decision must be made within the time and
according to the procedure specified by the board of county commissioners."32 As
discussed in Point IV below, the City precisely followed County directions in appealing
the rezoning decision.
Section 17-27-16 actually provides a procedure for appealing alleged errors in
zoning enforcement decisions to the board of adjustment. The record does not disclose
whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board of adjustment. If it has, that

Opinion, p. 39. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A.M
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1).
Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A."
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board does not review rezonings.33 Its powers are expressly limited to considering
alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning resolution."34
The City does not allege an error in zoning enprcement. It attacks the
jurisdiction of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional
use permit. As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been
applied to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal.35
POINT IV
THE PANEL'S DECISION WAS RENDERED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF
BRIEFING AND ARGUMENT AND CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE
SUPREME COURTS POWER OF SUPERVISION TO CORRECT
RESULTING ERRORS
A
THE PANEL MISCONSTRUED THE FACTUAL RECORD
CONCERNING SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's
rezoning but erroneously states that "there is no dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal
the rezoning" pursuant to §17-27-16. That conclusion arose partly from the lack of
briefing or argument and the misconstruction of §17-27-16 discussed above. However, a
misunderstanding of the factual record is also implied in the conclusion.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that (1) the City raised its development
objections prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was
not available to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the

33

Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan &
Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); Ga)iand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633,
635 (1961); CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976).
34

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added.

35

Thurston, supra^p. 446, confirms that the board of adjustment is not "the exclusive repository of appellate
powers."
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City's objection; (3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may
violate urban development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the
property, deferring its decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the
development until a specific development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested
reconsideration of the County's decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was
denied and the City was directed to pursue its objection through the conditional use
process; (7) the City complied with the County's direction and fully participated at all
stages of the conditional use process as defined by ordinance; and (8) through this
action, the City timely appealed the rezoning and conditional use permits in the manner
defined by the County Attorney.
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this
development. The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative
appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally
in the record and by ordinance. The City followed all those procedures and made its
objections in a timely fashion at each stage.
Where the parties have agreed on an appeal procedure which is consistent with
all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes unfairness to refuse rudimentary
discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis that an alternative procedure
was not selected. The Court would advance justice by providing the same presumption
to the County's defined grievance procedure as the Panel did to all other aspects of the
County's decisions. The Panel's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record
of these events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process.
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B.
THE PANEL ALSO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT COUNTY
FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County
had made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."36 This
conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that
development costs for the site would exceed $750,000:
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to
day, however, the value of the development is determined when the
building permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people
to purchase a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid
annexation. In this particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire
site is developed it will exceed the $750,000 figure. This legal issue will have
to be addressed with the cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy
City."37
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that
their costs for just the first twD of numerous building pads was $760,000.38 No evidence
was introduced to refute this testimony.39 The County's findings therefore directly
contradict the undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was
misplaced. The court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts
contained in the record on appeal.

* Opinion, p. 14.
37

R i l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
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Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10.

39

R1Q8. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not
address costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's
findings even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that
a residuum of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is
discussed on p. 18 of Appellant's reply brief.
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CONCLUSION
The Panel's detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted in
several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, would materially alter the Panel's
decision. A motion for rehearing has been unsuccessful before the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, this petition is presented to the Supreme Court in an effort to settle the
important questions of municipal law which have be'en raised by the Panel's decision.
Those questions are central to the ability of local communities to efficiently deliver vital
urban services to their residents and to implement their goals and objectives through
their elected officials.
DATED thi<P

day of September, 1990.

Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
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APPENDIX "A"

10-1-104.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class,
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah,
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments.
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided:
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the
city commission;
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city council;
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council.
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities.
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in § 10-2-301.
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to
town clerks.
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law.
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street,
alley, public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or
other public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality,
by some other political subdivision of the state or by the state.
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service delivery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity.
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by
incorporated area of one or more municipalities.
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development for which cost
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases.

10-2-401. Legislative policy.
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that:
(1) Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic
development of this state;
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of public
health, safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial
areas, and in areas undergoing development;
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with specific standards, to include areas where a high quality of urban governmental services is needed and can be provided for the protection of public
health, safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation
and the proliferation of special service districts;
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing municipality, subject to § 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the annexation;
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government;
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban development need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of the
proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other government entities, on the need for and cost of local government services and
the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, and on
factors related to population growth and density and the geography of the
area; and
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state responsibility.

10-2-418. Urban development restrictions.
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that a
property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said onehalf mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and identify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an annexation
to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from the filing with
the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and diligent effort by
said property owner to annex, said property owner may develop as otherwise
permitted by law. Urban development beyond one-half mile of a municipality
may be restricted or an impact statement required when agreed to in an
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal Co-operation Act.

10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled —
Transmission of papers.
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.

10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limitation.
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
board.

17-27-16. Appeals — Powers of board.
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
by his inability to obtain a building permit, or by the decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon or made in the course of the
adminstration or enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution. Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any officer, department,
board or bureau of the county affected by the grant or refusal of a building
permit or by other decision of an administrative officer or agency based on or
made in the course of the administration or enforcement of the provisions of
the zoning resolution. The time within which such appeal must be made, and
the form or other procedure relating thereto, shall be as specified in the general rules provided in writing by the board of county commissioners to govern
the procedure of such board of adjustment or in the supplemental rules of
procedure adopted by such board provided further, that said rules and regulations shall be available to the public at the office of the county commissioners
at all times.
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that
there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by
administrative official or agency based on or made in the enforcement of
the zoning resolution.
(2) To hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any such
resolution, requests for special exceptions or for interpretation of the map
or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is
authorized by any such resolution to pass.
(3) Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of
a specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the regulation,
or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary
and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict
application of any regulation enacted under this act would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue
hardships upon, the owner of such property, to authorize, upon an appeal
relating to said property, a variance from such strict application so as to
relieve such difficulties or hardship, provided such relief may be granted
without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning resolutions.
The concurring vote of four members of the board in the case of a fivemember board, and of three members in the case of a three-member board,
shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or determination of any such administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the
aonellant.
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the development cost is in excess of S750,OOO.
Cite as
On August 5, 1987, at the property owner;
136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
request, the Salt Lake County Commissior
without amending its master plan, adopted
IN THE
zoning ordinance which permitted commerci;
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
development on the present property. Sand
City objected to the rezoning but failed t
SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation,
appeal the decision. 1
Plaintiff and Appellant,
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, tli
v.
agent for the property owners and Chevror
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
applied to Salt Lake County for a condition;
subdivision of the State of Utah; Salt Lake
use permit to build a Chevron service statioi
County Planning Commission; K. Delyn
car wash, and mini-convenience store on .
Yeates; R. Scott Priest; VV. Scott Kjar; Steven
acres of the property. This application indi<
E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker, Inc.; and
ated that the estimated value of the proje<
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
was $250,000. The property owners also int<
Defendants and Appellees.
nded to build a McDonald's restaurant on tl
property. On September 30, 1987, they file
No. 880429-CA
another conditional use permit applicatic
FILED: June 7, 1990
which valued the McDonald's project «
approximately 5300,000. The property ownei
Third District, Salt Lake Countydid not petition to annex the property t
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Sandy City.
ATTORNEYS:
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City prot
sted the Chevron application, indicating th;
Walter R. Miller, Sandy, for Appellant
"Sandy City is currently considering annex;
Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt Lake City, for
tion of the property and the annexation w:
Appellees
require an independent consideration <
Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot and Posteroproper zoning for this property." It also un
Blecker,Inc. Leonard J. Lewis, Salt Lake
uccessfully petitioned the Salt Lake Coun
City, for Appellee Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Commission to reconsider and amend its pr
Kent S. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
viously passed zoning ordinance.
Salt Lake County
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake Coun
Planning Commission approved the Chevrc
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson.
conditional use application. On October 1
1987, Sandy City appealed this decision. Tl
OPINION
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, fc
lowing several public hearings, denied Sane
GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial court's City's appeal and entered findings of fact.
Sandy City then appealed the condition
dismissal of its action against defendants Salt
use
decision to the Salt Lake County Comr
Lake County, property owners Yeates, Priest,
Kjar, and Smoot, and developers Postero- ission, which held a hearing on December
1987. The Salt Lake County Commissic
Blecker, Inc. (Postero-Blecker) and Chevron
USA, Inc. (Chevron). We affirm the trial i affirmed the Salt Lake County Plannir
Commission's grant of the Chevron condii
court's dismissal of Sandy City's action.
or:"1 use permit, finding that the requin
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of
commercial property located on the northwest statu lory procedure had been followed ai
corner of 10600 South and 1300 East in uni- that the grant of the conditional use pernncorporated Salt Lake County. The property was in the community's interest. Sandy Ci
abuts Sandy City's boundaries and is located then brought this action in the district court.
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake Coun
within an unincorporated "island" within
filed
with the district court the affidavit <
Sandy City's limits. Since 1976, the county
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Plannii
master plan and Sandy City plans have called
Commission's administrative assistant, ai
for rural residential uses of the property.
In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plannii
annexation policy declaration which, among Commission's September 22 and October 1
1987 meetings, at which Chevron's condition
other things, delineated twenty-one unincouse
permit application had been discussed ai
rporated islands within the city boundaries
which Sandy City was willing to annex, incl- interested parties had presented evidene
Subsequently, Sandy City submitted an af
uding the present parcel. According to Sandy
City, this policy declaration requires property davit indicating that the projected cost o\~ t
owners to first attempt to annex to Sandy Chevron development was between $660,0
to S760.000, and that the cost of the McD
City, thereby obviating the County's approval
n
a l d ' s development would be betwe<
for development of commercial propertv when
| S900,0(K) and SI, 100,000. Simultaneously, S;
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ike County submitted the minutes of the
pril 28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake
Dunty Planning Commission, which involved
scussion of the zoning change, along with
elen Christiansen's authenticating affidavit.
11 parties moved for summary judgment.
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt Lake
aunty's affidavits, alleging that they failed
conform to the requirements of rule 56(e)
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Chevron
sponded by filing an affidavit indicating that
e building value of the proposed Chevron
ttionwasS175,000.
On February 4, 1988, the day before the
aring on Salt Lake County's motion for
mmary judgment, Sandy City's attorney
)ved for additional discovery time pursuant
rule 56(0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procure.
During the hearing on February 5, 1988,
It Lake County requested permission to
roduce into evidence the certified record of
*. administrative hearings. These records
:luded the previously submitted commission
nutes, with additional maps and supporting
iterials. Sandy City's counsel objected,
ting that he did not know what the admitrative record contained and, thus, the
ord was prejudicial. The district court
»rruled Sandy City's objection and allowed |
: record to be entered into evidence. On
?ruary 19, 1988, Salt Lake County submii the minutes of the December 9, 1987
eting of the Salt Lake County Commission,
itaining the appeal of the conditional use
mit grant, along with the administrative
istant's supporting affidavit.
>alt Lake County filed the complete certi- i
i administrative record with the district
irt on March 3, 1988. On March 15, 1988, j
district court entered its decision, finding
t the Salt Lake County Planning Commis- |
i had properly issued the conditional use I
mit, and that defendants' actions did not |
late the annexation statute, Utah Code
n. § 1 0 - 2 - 4 1 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . It g r a n t e d |
imary judgment in favor of defendants and
-nissed Sandy City's action. Subsequently,
idy City unsuccessfully moved for an inj:tion on the development of the property
ing the pendency of the appeal. It then
ught this appeal.
)n appeal, Sandy - City challenges the
imary judgment, first arguing that there
e substantial issues of material fact making
imary judgment improper because: (1) Salt
;e County untimely submitted the adminsive record in violation of rule 6(d) of the
;h Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Salt Lake
inty's administrative record and affidavits
e untimely filed in violation of rule 56 of
Utah Rules o( Civil Procedure; (3) the
davits and other evidence presented by
:vron violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate

evidentiary foundation; (4) the trial court
erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's rule
56(f)-motion for further discovery; and (5)
there were substantial issues of material fact in
the record. Sandy City's second major assignment of error is that the trial court erroneously interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§10-2418 and 10-1-4(11) (1986) by ruling that (1)
to preclude urban development of the property
at issue, Sandy City had to formally declare its
intention to annex it prior to the occurrence of
the events leading to this lawsuit, and (2) the
Chevron development, and possibly the
McDonald's development, did not constitute
"urban development" under section 10-14(11).
I. FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Before we address Sandy City's contentions,
however, it is necessary to examine the scope
of our review in cases dealing with summary
judgment and municipal zoning issues.2
In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court "considers] the evidence in the
light most favorable to the losing party, and
affirm[s] only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of
fact, or where, even according to the facts as
contended by the losing party, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283
(UtahCt. App. 1987).
It is well established in Utah that "courts of
law cannot substitute their judgment in the
area of zoning regulations for that of the
[municipality's] governing body." Naylor v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398
P.2d 27, 29 (1965) (footnote omitted). Instead,
the courts afford a comparatively wide latitude
of discretion to administrative bodies charged
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as
endowing their actions with a presumption of
correctness and validity, because of the complexity of factors involved in the matter of
zoning and the specialized knowledge of the
administrative body. Cottonwood
Heights
Citizen Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d
138, 140 (Utah 1979). Thus, the courts will not
consider the wisdom, necessity, or advisability
or otherwise interfere with a zoning determination unless "it is shown that there is no
reasonable basis to justify the action taken." Id.
In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann. §109-15 (1986) indicates that an aggrieved party
may "maintain a plenary action for relief"
from any decision of the municipal body
within thirty days of the filing of the decision.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
statutory language 'plenary action tor relief
therefrom' presupposes the continued existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an appeal rather than a trial de novo."
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d
1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). However, "[t]he
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nature and extent of tlie review depends on
what happened below as reflected hy a true
record of the proceedings, viewed in the light
of accepted due process requirements." Denver
<£ Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Central Weber
Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 Utah 2d 105, 287
P.2d 8S4, 887 (1955). The supreme court also
found, in Xanthos, that where a hearing has
proceeded in accordance with due process
requirements, the reviewing court can look
only to the record, which consists of the
hearing minutes along with the formal findings
and order. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034.
However, where no record is preserved, and
there is, consequently, nothing to review, the
reviewing court may take evidence. Id. While
this evidence is not necessarily limited .to the
evidence presented below, the reviewing court
may not retry the case on the merits or substitute its judgment for that of the municipal
body. Id.
Because an administrative record has been
preserved in the present circumstance, we find
that this matter should be reviewed on the
record, and that a de novo trial is inappropriate.
Under these standards of review, we now
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial
court improperly granted summary judgment
on evidentiary issues.
A. Admission of Administrative Record
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake
County untimely submitted the administrative
record in violation of rule 6(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues that rule
6(d) requires supporting affidavits to be submitted at the time a party files a motion for
summary judgment, and that the administrative record is analogous to a supporting affidavit. Because the County submitted the
administrative record during the hearing on
the motion for summary judgment, rather
than beforehand, and, consequently, failed to
give Sandy City notice of the contents of the
record, Sandy City concludes that the trial
court should not have considered the evidence
contained in this record in arriving at its
summary judgment. On the other hand, the
County argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not set forth any specific procedure
for certifying an administrative record from a
county commission to the district court, so
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it deals
only with the filing of affidavits.
In relevant part, rule 6(d) states:
When a motion is supported by an
affidavit, the affidavit shall be
served with the motion; and, except
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c),
opposing affidavits may be served
not later than 1 day before the
hearing, unless the court permits
them to be served at some other
time.
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Prior to the hearing before the district court
on February 5, 1988, the County submitted
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission hearings held on April 28, May
12, September 22, October 13, and October
27, 1987, along with authenticating affidavits.
These minutes contained testimony on all ol
the disputed issues. The record which the
County moved to be placed into evidence
during the district court hearing contained
these minutes, accompanied by some docum
entation and a large quantity of plat maps
but did not add materially to the relevani
information already before the court. The
court admitted this record into evidence ovei
the strenuous objections of Sandy City, stating
that "everything down there is not essential tc
a determination of these motions. And I thinl
that quite apart from this, [even] if the cour
disregarded this, it will have before it suffic
ient undisputed facts of law to make decision!
in the matter." Subsequently, the court adm
itted into evidence, as part of the record, th<
minutes of the Salt Lake County Commissioi
hearing held on December 9, 1987, which hac
not previously been available, and variou;
documents that were specifically requested b;
Sandy City's attorney.
Our review of the record, including th<
administrative record submitted to the court
indicates that if there was any error in admi
tting the administrative record, it was harmles
because it was essentially cumulative wit)
respect to the evidence already before th
court. Further, some of the subsequent!;
admitted evidence was admitted at Sand;
City's request.
However, we find that the trial court dii
not err in admitting the administrative recon
at the time of trial. If we follow rule 6(d) lit
erally, styling the administrative record as th
equivalent of an affidavit in support of
motion for summary judgment, the document
must be served not later than one day befor
the hearing unless the court permits them t
be s.-rved at some other time. The court, the
refore, has discretion to admit such document
at other times, including during the hearing
In this case, the court admitted document
during and after the hearing, in response t
requests made by both parties.
However, there are limitations to this disc
retion. Although the Utah Supreme Court ha
found that the notice provisions of rule 6(c
are not hard and fast, it has stated that a tri;
court may dispense with technical complianc
to them only if there is satisfactory proof th<
a party had "actual notice and time to prepai
to meet the questions raised by the motion c
an adversary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2
423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnoi
omitted); see also Western States Thrift
Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 5(
P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 1
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ah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962).
Although Sandy City objected to the admion of the administrative record on the
3und that it did not know what it contained
d, therefore, was unprepared to argue
ainst it, the trial court properly denied this
jection because the entire record was a
itter of public record, had been on file for a
bstantial period of time prior to the hearing,
d both parties had access to it. Further,
nificant portions of the record, in the form
the commission minutes, were already
fore the court and Sandy City had ample
portunity to become familiar with them. We
d no abuse of discretion in the court's
ing.
B. Adequate Evidentiary Foundation
Sandy City's next claim of error is that the
Idavits and other evidence presented by
levron and the other defendants violate rule
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
:ause they lacked an adequate evidentiary
indation.
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that
]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be
,de on personal knowledge, shall set forth
:h facts as would be admissible in evidence,
i shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
npetent to testify to the matters stated
rein." Inadmissible evidence cannot be
isidered in ruling on a motion for summary
Igment, D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d
), 421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments
State Farm Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 693, 695
ah Ct. App. 1989); so an affidavit which
?s not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) is
rject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank
Salt Lake, 28 Utah 64, 498 P.2d 352, 353(1972); see also Blomquist, 504 P.2d at
10-21 (an affidavit containing statements
de only "on information and belief" is
ufficient and will be disregarded).
Jandy City moved to strike defendants'
idavits for their failure to conform to these
uirements. In its motion to strike, Sandy
y attacked defendant Chevron's memorajm in support of its motion for summary
gment and the affidavit of Helen J. Chrimsen, along with its attached exhibits, to
extent that they were used to establish the
:gations set forth in Chevron's memoralm.

ielen J. Christiansen's affidavits served to
iblish that she was the custodian of the
ord before the Salt Lake County Planning
mmission and that, on the basis of her
sonal knowledge, the hearing minutes and a
»y of McDonald's Corporation's applicai for a conditional use permit were the
reet records of the Salt Lake County Plang Commission. Under rules 902(4) and
5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, public
Drds are admissible as an exception to the
eral rule excluding hearsay evidence if they
"certified as correct by the custodian."
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Utah R. Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christiansen's affidavit conformed to rule 56(e) with
regard to the admission of the exhibits as
portions of the administrative record before
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission.
As such, they are admissible evidence and are
not subject to a motion to strike.
Sandy City challenges various statements
made in these minutes as being without evidentiary foundation. These allegations,
however, go to the merits of granting the
conditional use permit and not to any procedural defects. Therefore, we are not concerned
with them under our standard of review.
Consequently, we find Sandy City's objections
to the foundation of statements made in the
record to be without merit.
C. Further Discovery
Sandy City argues that the district court
erred in refusing to permit it to conduct
further discovery pursuant to rule 56(f) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(0
provides that a court may continue a motion
for summary judgment to permit the moving
party to obtain affidavits or take depositions.
Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).
Rule 56(f) reads as follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that
he cannot for reasons stated present
by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order
as is just.
It is generally held that rule 56(0 motions
should be granted liberally to provide adequate opportunity for discovery, Cox v.
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838,
841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); because information gained during discovery may create
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Downtown
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, courts are
unwilling to "spare the litigants from their
own lack of diligence," Callioux, 745 P.2d at
841 (quoting Heberf v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d
218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)), so do not grant rule
56(0 motions when dilatory or lacking in
merit. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Downtown Athletic Club, 740 P.2d at 27879.
A rule 56(0 movant must file an affidavit to
preserve his or her contention that summary
judgment should be delayed pending further
discovery. Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841. In this
affidavit, the movant must explain how the
requested continuance will aid his or her
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opposition to summary judgment. Id. The trial
court has discretion to determine whether the
reasons stated in a rule 56(0 affidavit arc
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639.
Sandy City filed an affidavit with the court
along with its rule 56(f) motion, stating that it
had been unable to take defendants* depositions or to obtain a certified copy of certain
county commission minutes. It indicated that
it wanted to pursue additional discovery which
would show that: (1) the proposed use of the
property contradicted the county master plan
and that insufficient evidence had been presented to the County Planning Commission to
demonstrate conformity with the plan; (2) the
proposed zoning would not contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood; (3)
the proposed use would be detrimental to the
health, safety, and general welfare of persons
residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope,
costs, and impact of the development was not
accurately and fully communicated to the
county officials during the decision-making
process; and (5) the costs of the development
would substantially exceed $750,000.
To determine whether this affidavit was
sufficient to merit a rule 56(0 continuance,
several factors must have been considered:
(1) Were the reasons articulated in
the Rule 56(0 affidavit "adequate"
or is the party against whom
summary judgment is sought merely
on a "fishing expedition" for purely
speculative facts after substantial
discovery has been conducted
without producing any significant
evidence? (2) Was there sufficient
time since the inception of the
lawsuit for the party against whom
the summary judgment is sought to
use discovery procedures, and
thereby cross-examine the moving
party? (3) If discovery procedures
were timely initiated, was the nonmoving party afforded an appropriate response?
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 764
P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club, 740
P.2d at 278.
In determining if Sandy City's request for
further discovery was meritorious, we first
consider the relevant standard of review. As
we noted above, in municipal zoning decisions, the courts do not consider the wisdom,
necessity, or advisability of particular actions.
See Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, 652
P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Utah 1982). Instead, the
reviewing court may consider whether the
municipality acted in conformance with its
enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant to
its comprehensive plan. Naylor v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 2829 (1965). The court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the municipality on the
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merits of these issues, however. Id. at 129.
The trial record contained evidence as to
Salt Lake County's enabling statutes, ordinances, and plans. It also indicated that the Salt
Lake County Commission considered evidence
with respect to all the issues on which Sandy
City wished to perform additional discovery.
The Salt Lake County Commission made
findings of fact going to the merits of these
issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the
issues was improper under the standard of
review, but could properly be held with respect
to enabling statutes and procedural issues.
However, there was already substantial evidence on the record regarding the relevant
enabling statutes and plans. Further, Sandy
City did not allege in its affidavit that it
needed additional time to discover procedural
errors committed by Salt Lake County in
granting the conditional building permit.
Therefore, we find that the trial court could
reasonably conclude that the reasons Sandy
City articulated in its affidavit would produce
only cumulative evidence and, so, were inadequate to merit a continuance under rule 56(f)Further, Sandy City had sufficient time and
opportunity during the pendency of the action
before the county commissions to develop and
present evidence in its favor and to determine
and refute the defendants' evidence. The
record indicates that on August 5, 1987, the
Salt Lake County Commission adopted the
zoning ordinance allowing commercial development on the property at issue, following
hearings on the issue held in April and May of
1987. Sandy City objected to the rezoning at
this time but failed to appeal. On August 26,
1987, Postero-Blecker applied for the
Chevron conditional use permit. Sandy City
protested the application on September 18,
1987, and subsequently was involved in several
public hearings on the issue before both the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission and
the Salt Lake County Commission, at which it
had ample opportunity to present evidence.
Sc*rdy City appealed to the district court in
December 1987. The hearing on the summary
judgment motion was finely held on February
5, 1988, nearly a year after the initial zoning
hearings had taken place. As stated previously,
the court will not use a rule 56(0 motion to
shield the movant from his or her lack of
diligence.
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion,
[t]he mere averment of exclusive
knowledge or control of the facts
by the moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show
to the best of his ability what facts
are within the movant's exclusive
knowledge or control; what steps
have been taken to obtain the
desired information pursuant to
discovery procedures under the

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

)0E • CO
>vo, Utah

Sandy City v. Salt Lake County
136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38

Rules; and that he is desirous of
taking advantage of these discovery
procedures.
illioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J.
oore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's
deral Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)).
ndy City's affidavit did not comply with
ese requirements. Therefore, we conclude
at the district court did not abuse its discron in denying Sandy City's rule 56(0
ation.
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Sandy City argues that the court failed to
nsider evidence which created the following
nuine issues of material fact: (1) Sandy
ty's willingness to annex, as shown by its
press declaration in its annexation policy
claration and its attorney's statements
fore the Salt Lake County Planning Comssion; (2) that the projected cost of the
levron project exceeded $750,000, as shown
a certified appraisal setting the cost as
tween $660,000 and $760,000; (3) that the
levron station was only part of a larger
leme to develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in
it the Chevron station would take only 1/6
the parcel, the property owners' represejd that the property would be a "commercial
^division," and that they would be the sole
/elopers of the entire tract; (4) that the cost
• the entire development, excluding the cost
the land, would exceed $750,000; and (5)
J development was not in compliance with
: county master plan and county ordinances
ich called for rural use of the subject proty, and would create traffic hazards and
nning problems.
vfany of these issues are actually issues of
t. The only issues of fact are the projected
it of the project and whether the proposed
relopment was in compliance with the
inty master plan and county ordinances. As
have noted above, these issues were disced and evidence was presented before the
mtv commissions, which entered written
clings and decided them on their merits.
:ause their findings were supported by evilce, we do not disturb them on review. See
X Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d
3, 8 8 5 - 8 6 ( U t a h Ct. A p p . 1989)
ministrative agency's factual findings will
be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary and
•ricious").
II. LEGAL ISSUES
We next address Sandy City's contention
t the trial court erred in its interpretation
I application of Utah Code Ann. §10-2: (1986) and §10-1-4(11) (1986). Because
imary judgment is granted as a matter of
rather than fact, the appellate court is free
reappraise the trial court's legal concluss. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep.
9 (1989) (per curiam); Parents Against
ink Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeo-
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wners Ass'n, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Ct.
App. 1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v.
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv.
Rep. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1990).
A. Annexation Procedure
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 prohibits
urban development "within one-half mile of
a municipality in the unincorporated territory
which the municipality has proposed for
municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if
a municipality is willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the
standards and requirements set forth in this
chapter." (Emphasis added.) The parties disagree as to whether Sandy City, to prevent
urban development in the disputed territory,
was required under this statute to formally
declare its intention to annex the territory
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit.
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-414 (1986) requires a municipality, prior to annexing unincorporated territory of more than Five acres, to
adopt a policy declaration indicating the standard under which it is willing to annex the
territory. Sandy City argues that it expressly
declared its willingness to annex the property
before initiation of the present lawsuit by (1)
promulgating a general policy declaration
indicating its willingness to annex the property, if petitioned, along with twenty other
parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement
to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
that it was willing to annex the property. The
trial court found that Sandy City was obliged
to make a formal declaration of intent to
annex, in addition to its general policy declaration, to invoke the protection of section 102-414.
Even though Sandy City, in its master
policy declaration, had indicated its interest in
annexing the property should the property
owners so petition, the property owners never
petitioned, nor did Sandy City attempt to
annex the property on its own. Further, it did
not appeal the county's initial zoning decision
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-9-9
(1986), and raise this Issue at that time.
Instead, it waited to raise the issue on the
subsequent grant of the conditional use
permit, where the relevant issues do not
include the proposed use of the land or any
annexation issue, but only whether the proposed use comports with the previously enacted
zoning regulations and county master plan.
Because Sandy City could and should have
raised this issue earlier, we find that it is precluded from raising it now. See Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, we do not
address the issue of whether Sandy City was
required under section 10-2-418, in addition
to its master policy declaration, to officially
declare its willingness to annex a territory of
less than five acres.4 Consequently, we find
Sandy City's objection to be without merit.
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We affirm the trial court's finding against
Sandy City on this issue, even though we
assign a totally different rationale than that
used by the trial court. See, e.g.. Ostler v.
Ostler, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Ct. App.
1990).
B. Urban Development
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 (1986) states
thai "(ujrban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile of a
municipality in the unincorporated area which
the municipality has proposed for municipal
expansion in its policy declaration." "Urban
development" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§10-1-104(11) (1986) as "a housing subdivision involving more than 15 residential units
with an average of less than one acre per residential unit or a commercial or industrial
development for which cost projections exceed
$750,000 for any or all phases."
Pursuant to its objective of preventing the
proposed development of the disputed territory, Sandy City argues that the trial court
erred in finding the value of the proposed
development did not exceed $750,000 because
(1) the definition of "urban development"
under section 10-1-104 includes not only the
value of the building itself, but also the cost
of the land and the value of the building fixtures; and (2) the $750,000 figure encompasses
all commercial ventures to be built on the
disputed territory. Salt Lake County, on the
other hand, alleges that the only relevant cost
under the definition is that of the building
alone and does not include the land and building fixtures, and that the $750,000 figure
applies to each individual development venture
separately initiated on the property.
Again, because Sandy City has not made
any attempt to annex the territory and should
have raised its objections to urban development at the time of the zoning determination
rather than at the subsequent granting of a
conditional use permit, we decline to interpret
this statute. Because the interpretation of
section 10-2-414 would have no relevance to
the propriety of the county's grant of a conditional use permit under our standard of
review, any interpretation we would make
would be an advisory opinion, which we
decline to issue under well established standards of judicial review. See Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350,
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where the result in
the prior action constitutes the full relief
available to the parties on the same claim, or
where the issue could and should have been
litigated in the prior action, the claim is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep.
32, 33 (Ct. App. 1990) (there is a longstanding
judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory opinions). Therefore, we find this issue to be
without merit.
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Regnal W. Garff, Judge
I CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Under Utah Code Ann. §17-27-16 (1987), ar
appeal from a zoning decision must be made withir
the time and according to the procedure specified bj
the board of county commissioners. While thes<
regulations are not a part of this record, there is n<
dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezoninj
pursuant to these regulations.
2. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes an<
characterizes some of the issues as annexation
related, however this appeal is from the grant of i
conditional use permit, a zoning function.
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings state
in part:
1. The estimated cost of the development is approximately $175,000
2. This development is consistent with
the intent of the Salt Lake County
Master Plan by placing commercial
development at major intersections
within the county. The Little Cottonwood District Plan was generally intended to be applicable through 1985 and
the map is now outdated in this immediate area. Since the adoption of the
plan in 1976, Sandy City rezoned the
northeast corner of 10600 South 1300
East to commercial, which changed the
character of the intersection. Additional
commercial development is now appropriate at this intersection and is consistent with the existing development approved by Sandy City.
3. The development will provide
additional gasoline services which are
needed and desirable in the neighborhood and community....
4. The development is buffered from
adjacent residential uses by property
zoned R-M and will not be detrimental
to the health, safety or general welfare
of persons residing or working in the
vicinity or injurious to property or
improvements in the vicinity. The traffic
engineer has reviewed and approved the
application. Upon compliance with the
conditions required by the Planning
Commission, the development will be an
attractive addition to the community.
5. The proposed use will comply with
the regulation and conditions of the
Zoning Ordinance.
4. We note that the property at issue
consists of 4.18 acres while section 102-418 applies to parcels consisting of at
least five acres. Therefore, section 10-2418 would be inapplicable in the present
case.
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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR PETITION
The City is appreciative of the attention and courtesy extended by the court to the
parties at oral argument. However, the court's Opinion, filed one year thereafter, departs
from both the facts and law argued by the parties and relied upon by the lower court. The
passage of time and this detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted
in several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, should materially alter this court's
opinion.
These errors are not merely technical. They form the basis upon which the merits
of the entire action were avoided. They are thus fundamental to the rights of the parties.
They also involve important public policy as set forth more fully herein. Correction of these
errors will promote principles of justice, sound development and local governance.
Appellant respectfully requests that this court review the statutes and case law and
apply them to the actual record as discussed herein, and to grant appellant the opportunity
for oral argument on such issues as are presented in this petition, as provided in Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH ZONING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTES
HAVE BEEN MISAPPREHENDED
A

THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE AND TO APPLY A
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO STATUTES OF THAT
CLASS.
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be

approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."

"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."1
This statute limits Salt Lake County's jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject
matter. It expressly forbids the County to "approve or permit" commercial development in
excess of $750,000 within one-half mile of Sandy City. County ordinances also prohibit the
County from approving use permits which contradict the master plan.2
A central issue in Sandy City's appeal from summary judgment by the district court
is whether respondents' development exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the
County of approval authority. The County Director of Development Services, testifying
before the Planning Commission, confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will
exceed the $750,000 figure."3 Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that
their costs for just the first two pads was $760,000.4 A later MAI appraisal showed that the
costs of the entire development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development
restriction.5
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. But, Salt Lake County is
subject to the same tendencies as other large bureaucracies - it seeks to maximize its own
interests and authority. Despite the testimony of the developers and its own staff, it found

1

UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986).

2

R22.

3

Rill.

4

R108.

5

R133-135.
2

that development costs were less than $750,000.
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that it could consider whether the County
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.6 It
cited Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation7 for the proposition that the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue.
The Naylor case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of the
City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that n[t]he statutory
authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and amending the same
is not questioned" in that case.8 Thus the Naylor court merely confirmed that courts should
not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative discretion.
Statutory authority is the central issue in the instant appeal. Jurisdictional issues are
not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized only
where counties act within their authority:
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an
abuse of discretion."9

6

Opinion, p. 11.

7

16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965).

8

Id., at p. 28.

9

Thurston v. Cache Ctyy 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. Board
of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its
authority."
3

There is hardly a more important issue before any court than the unlawful use of
governmental power. Courts have been established to check such excesses. Salt Lake
County and its planning commission are agencies of limited jurisdiction. Their "authority"
is dependent entirely upon the terms of the statutes reposing power in them. They cannot
confer jurisdiction on themselves by making findings contrary to the evidence before them.
If the mandatory provisions of their enabling statutes are not met, they have no authority
to proceed.
The review standard applied in this appeal reverses the proper role of the courts.
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, it becomes the validator of the
same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of evidence
which consistently denies them such powers. The Court of Appeals could not have
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests that
the court reconsider the review standard it so broadly applied in this appeal.
B.

THE MUNICIPAL CODE AND BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES
RELIED ON BY THE COURT HAVE NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER TO
REZONINGS BY ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS.
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code and one statute

from the enabling act for counties, as the basis for its refusal to review the merits of this
appeal.10 These statutes have no application to this appeal for the following reasons:
UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16. This statute was cited to establish that "an appeal
from a zoning decision must be made within the time and according to the procedure

Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix "A."
4

specified by the board of county commissioners."11 More specifically, this section provides
a procedure for appealing alleged errors in zoning enforcement decisions to the board of
adjustment.
The record does not disclose whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board
of adjustment. If it has, its members are not elected officials - they are appointed by the
county commission.12 For this reason, they do not review zoning decisions.13 Their powers
are expressly limited to considering alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning
resolution."14
The City does not allege an error in zoning enforcement. It attacks the jurisdiction
of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional use permit.
As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been applied to avoid
consideration of the merits of this appeal.
The Appellate Court's interpretation also contravenes Utah case law. For instance,
the Utah Supreme Court has approved a county commission's decision to not bestow on the
board of adjustment the power to issue special zoning exceptions. The county commission
elected to wield such power on its own. The Court emphasized that "the Board of
Adjustments is constituted by statute a forum for review of all administrative zoning
decisions, but nowhere is it made the exclusive repository of appellate powers."15

11

Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A."

12

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-15.

13

Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); Gayiand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 635
(1961); CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Fiord Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976).
14

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added.
Thurston, supra, p. 446. Emphasis added.
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Serious problems will result if the instant interpretation remains. The Court's
conclusion that zoning challenges must pursue board of adjustment appeal transfers
legislative policy-making powers from the elected officials of the County to a board which
is not responsible to the electorate. Such a construction poses immense governance
problems and promotes conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities as
articulated by their elected representatives. Under the restrictive standard of review
imposed by the Court in this appeal, the public would have virtually no ability to overturn
a zoning by such a non-elected body. Such a serious precedent should not have been
established without some briefing or oral argument by the parties.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a second basis
for its conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.16 This
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to city
board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials.

This section has

nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be
applied to this case.17
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. Like
the County's board of adjustment statute,18 it addresses only to appeals from enforcement
decisions and does not authorize the board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones
themselves. Further, this section does not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals.

16

Opinion, p. 15. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A."

17

See Davis County v. Clearfeld City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court of Appeals
rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to municipal
planning matters.
18

See Section 1, above.
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Section 10-9-9 is facially inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the
basis to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal. Further, application of that
section in this appeal poses the same legal and governance problems as use of the County
board of adjustment statute. Its retention in the Court's decision will create a precedent
of serious consequence.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also used to establish that the City
had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's rezoning.19 This
section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing decisions by city boards of
adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part of the Utah Municipal Code
and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities for the purposes of that code and
this section has nothing to do with County zoning decisions whatsoever.20 Even if it did
apply to counties, it does not purport to establish a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning
decisions.
The immediate effect of these errors is to deny the parties consideration of
the merits of this appeal. The long-term effect is greater. If permitted to stand, this
decision will create confusion of governance principles and likely undermine the ability of
citizens to implement their goals and objectives through their elected officials in many
communities of our state.

Opinion, p. 15. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A."
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1).
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POINT II
THE FACTUAL RECORD HAS BEEN MISSTATED
A.

SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT WERE TIMELY AND
COMPLETE
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's

rezoning but states that such objection was untimely and incomplete. That conclusion
arose partly from misapplication of the statutes discussed in Point I above. However, some
misconstruction of the factual record was also implied in the conclusion. As shown below,
the actual appeal record does not support this criticism:
1.

There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing.21

The County only provided the City with a copy of the rezoning application and requested
its recommendation.22

The zoning application omitted the estimate of project value

required by the application form. But it did admit that the rezoning would not comply
with the County's current land use plan.23 To this admission, the City's objection added
that the plan also violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Crescent Community
Citizen's Report.24
2.

There was "not a specific use proposed for the overall properties" at the time

the application was made25 or when rezoning was considered.26 Value would not be

Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2.
22

R15-17.

23

R15.

24

R17.

25

R15.

26

Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904.
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determined until a building permit was actually issued.27 It would have been impossible for
the City to have estimated the cost of development at that time.28 Even though there was
no project information available, the City could still inform the County that "[t]he developer
should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." This is exactly what the City did.29
3.

At the hearing on the matter, the County Commission was briefed on Sandy's

objection to the rezoning.30 The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that
there may be a problem with the development meeting the urban development restrictions
of section 10-2-418 U.C.A., depending on how the development plans were eventually
presented. He then stated that "Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the
time the plans were submitted.31
4.

Based on representations of the Deputy County Attorney and other staff

members, the County Commission approved the rezoning.32 The ordinance was published
on August 20, 1987.33
5.

Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a rehearing

of its zoning decision.34 That petition reiterated that "[development on the property would

R i l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
28

The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask for
a different zone depending on the market." The zoning was thereupon approved by the County Commission
without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property.
29

R17.

30

Envelope 5, Document 6.

31

Id., p. 906.

32

Id., pp. 906-907.

33

R19.
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constitute 'urban development' and that the property owners had not attempted to annex
the property to Sandy City as required by 10-2-418, U.C.A 1953." The petition also stated
that "[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this property contradicts the Little
Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for rural residential use on the
property."35
6.

The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit City

representatives to speak.36 The Commission denied the City's request and directed that if
the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning Commission
through the conditional use process.37
7.

The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its protest

to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and master plan
violations described above.38 When that was unsuccessful, the City filed a timely appeal to
the County Commission as required by County ordinance.39 When its protests were rejected
there, the City promptly initiated this action in conformance with the process defined by the
County Attorney.40

35

id.

36

T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p. 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had "ample
opportunity to present evidence." p. 13.
Envelope 5, Documents 8 - 9 .
38

R27-29.

39

R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision).
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"Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not the half mile is applicable." Envelope 5,
Document 9, p. 1114.
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The above chronology illustrates that (1) the City raised its development objections
prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was not available
to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the City's objection;
(3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may violate urban
development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the property, deferring its
decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the development until a specific
development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested reconsideration of the County's
decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was denied and the City was directed
to pursue its objection through the conditional use process; (7) the City complied with the
County's direction and fully participated at all stages of the conditional use process as
defined by ordinance; and (8) through this action, the City timely appealed the rezoning
and conditional use permits in the manner defined by the County Attorney.
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this
development. The court's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record of these
events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process.
B.

THE COUNTY'S FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County had

made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."41

This

conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that development
costs for the site would exceed $750,000:
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to day,
however, the value of the development is determined when the building
permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people to purchase

41

Opinion, p. 14.
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a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid annexation. In this
particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire site is developed it will
exceed the $750,000figure.This legal issue will have to be addressed with the
cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy City."42
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that their
costs for just the first two of numerous building pads was $760,000.43 No evidence was
introduced to refute this testimony.44 The County's findings therefore directly contradict the
undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was misplaced. The
court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts contained in the record
on appeal.
POINT III
THE COURTS DECISION WILL CAUSE
UNFAIRNESS IF NOT CORRECTED
The City respectfully suggests that the foregoing errors of law and fact will cause
unfairness to the parties if not corrected. The following are examples of this effect:
1.

The principle basis of the court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative

defense by any of the parties to this action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered
by the parties, the agencies, or lower court. Thus, the parties have been entirely deprived
of the opportunity to address the issue upon which their rights were determined.

R i l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
43

Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10.

44

R108. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not address
costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's findings
even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that a residuum
of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is discussed on p. 18
of Appellant's reply brief.
12

2.

The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative

appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally in
the record and by ordinance.

The City followed all those procedures and made its

objections in a timely fashion at each stage. Where the parties have agreed on an appeal
procedure which is consistent with all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes
unfairness to refuse rudimentary discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis
that an alternative procedure was not selected.

The court would advance justice by

providing the same presumption to the County's defined grievance procedure as it has to
all other aspects of the County's decisions.
3.

The court's decision to permit a local government to submit massive amounts

of evidentiary materials at summary judgment hearings, without advance notice to the
parties and without permitting a recess to review the same, and after the opposing party has
completed its briefing and oral argument, creates a precedent certain to undermine the
ability of future citizens to avoid the ambush inherent in such a procedure.45
4.

To conclude that the City "had sufficient time and opportunity during the

pendency of the action before the county commissions to develop and present evidence in
its favor and to determine and refute the defendants' evidence"46 overlooks the fact that the
proposed projects had not been disclosed or that development costs were otherwise

The court seems to have assumed that the approximately six inches of documents submitted by the County
in this action were maintained by the County prior to the action in the same condition as they were presented
to the district court. That assumption is not supported by the record and is not accurate. The record was
assembled by the County from numerous sources for purposes of the summary judgment hearing. Some
selectivity is inherent in such a process as evidenced by the fact that the record was determined to be incomplete
when presented and had to be supplemented. If the county attorney was unable to locate all the relevant records
for the hearing it is difficult to see how a citizen of the county can be assumed to have complete advance
knowledge of the same.
46

Opinion, p. 13.
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unavailable from the developers. It was the County, not the City, which failed in its burden
to require evidence of project costs and compliance with the master plan, so as to establish
a competent basis for its jurisdiction to proceed.47
5.

When the City was finally able to obtain a professional cost appraisal on its

own, demonstrating that the development would surely exceed $750,000, such estimates had
no effect on the County's decision to proceed with its approvals.48 To permit County
jurisdiction to be upheld solely on statements without competent evidentiary foundation
encourages the County to continue to ignore competent evidence when presented, contrary
to the facts and in its self interest.
6.

The court's conclusion that zoning challenger must pursue appeals to boards

of adjustment has the effect of transfering legislative policy-making powers from the elected
officials of the County to a board which is not responsible to the electorate. Such a
construction undermines representative government and separation of powers principles.
It also promotes administrative conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities
as articulated by their elected representatives.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant thanks the court for the extensive time it has taken to review this
case and the courtesy provided to the parties at oral argument. However, on the basis of
the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that there are significant factual and

County ordinance 19.84.090 places the evidentiary burden on the county to demonstrate conformance with
the intent of the county master plan. R22.
48

Envelope 1, Document 11, p. 1389. (McDonald Appeal)
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legal issues which compel a reconsideration of the court's decision. The Appellant also
believes that oral argument is appropriate in the circumstances as provided for in Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this

day of June, 1990.

Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney

CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
I, Walter R. Miller, attorney of record for Petitioner and Appellant, certify that this
petition is filed and presented in good faith and not for any purpose of delay.

Walter R. Miller
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APPENDIX

"A"

10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled —
Transmission of papers.
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.

10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limitation.
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
board.

17-27-15. Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings.
The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regulations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a board of adjustment
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such
members. Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged t h a t the
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appointments. The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of
such board, and in the event that any regular member be temporarily unable
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose.
The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning or
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, and
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsistent
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt supplemental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rules.
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provide
t h a t the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in the
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commissioners
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps and
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or similar
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulations.
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairman
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. The
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjustment
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other
official actions, all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of the
board and shall be a nublic record.
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Sandy City, a municipal
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 880429-CA

v.
Salt Lake County, a political
subdivision of the State of
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Commission; K. Delyn Yeates;
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